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SUCCESSOR MANAGEMENT'S OBLIGATIONS
UNDER EXISTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the general law of contracts, one acquires rights and obliga-
tions as a result of undertakings between specific parties to the
contract. The same is likewise true generally in the area of labor
relations. An employee representative is chosen in proceedings to
which both management and employees are parties. As a result of
this proceeding (election), management and the designated repre-
sentative may acquire an obligation to bargain in good faith with
each other. Pursuant to this bargaining, a contract may evolve
which will bind all parties according to its terms. Thus an employer
may be obligated to bargain and may be obligated to observe sub-
stantive contract provisions agreed upon in the course of the re-
quired bargaining.
This simple statement of law, applicable to an employer who
was a party to labor proceedings, was challenged early in the history
of labor law' by employers who acquired the business of another
employer which had been subject to bargaining and contract obliga-
tions. In response, the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter
the Board) and the lower courts developed the doctrine of successor-
ship.2 If a certain continuity remained in the "employing industry"
after a new employer began operations, the new employer would be
a "successor" and would be bound by certain labor obligations of
his predecessor. The Supreme Court first entered this area in 1964
with its opinion in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.3 The case
held a subsequent employer bound by an arbitration provision in its
predecessor's contract. This holding was expanded by subsequent
lower court decisions' until the Supreme Court in 1972 held, in
NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.,' that an em-
ployer does not, as a matter of law, become obligated to observe the
terms of a predecessor's contract. Because of the apparent inconsis-
tency between these two decisions, the Supreme Court attempted
1. Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1970) in 1935. While there had been several earlier pieces of labor legislation, this was the
first to offer basic rights to large numbers of employees.
2. NLRB v. Colton, 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939); Charles Cushman Co., 15 N.L.R.B.
90 (1939).
3. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
4. See pt. I1, § A(2) of this comment.
5. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
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to clarify the law of successorship in Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v.
Detroit Local Joint Executive Board.-
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that its decisions in
this area of labor law are largely dependent upon the precise facts
in each situation.' In Howard Johnson, the Court also stated that,
in developing the federal common law relating to the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, the courts should necessarily proceed with
caution.8 Nevertheless, by analyzing these three Supreme Court
decisions and the countless Board and lower court decisions before
and after each, this comment will attempt to determine a subse-
quent employer's obligations to bargain with a union representing
a predecessor's employees and to observe substantive terms of a
contract negotiated between the union and the predecessor.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "EMPLOYING INDUSTRY" CONCEPT
In 1939, the Sixth Circuit used the term "employing industry"
in a frequently quoted passage which formed the basis for the entire
doctrine of successorship.
It is the employing industry that is sought to be regulated and
brought within the corrective and remedial provisions of the Act
in the interest of industrial peace .... It needs no demonstration
that the strife which is sought to be averted is no less an object of
legislative solicitude when contract, death, or operation of law
brings about change of ownership in the employing agency.'
The term is a slight misnomer because it concerns the individual
business that is transferred rather than with the industry of which
the business is a part. Basically the doctrine means that if the
business is conducted in a manner, after the transfer of ownership,
substantially similar to the way in which it was operated before,
then "successorship" will exist with the attendant obligations, the
most important being the obligation to bargain with the previously
designated representative of the transferor's employees.
As the doctrine developed and was applied, the courts and the
Board looked to many factors in determining whether the "employ-
ing industry" remained unchanged. In an early decision, Charles
Cushman Co.,"0 the Board easily found "successorship" and a duty
6. - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 2236 (1974).
7. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., - U.S.-, , 94
S. Ct. 2236, 2240 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 274, 286
(1972).
8. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 94 S.Ct. 2236, 2240 (1974).
9. NLRB v. Colton, 105 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1939).
10. Charles Cushman Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 90 (1939).
1975]
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to bargain with the predecessor's union where the shareholders re-
mained identical, the management was essentially the same, and
the same employees remained employed under the same wages,
hours and other working conditions. In addition, the subsequent
employer had assumed portions of its predecessor's parent's indebt-
edness, stock of the successor was issued to shareholders of the
parent company in the same ratio as their existing holdings in the
parent, and the labor contract between the predecessor and the
union governing wages, hours, etc. was assumed by the new em-
ployer.
Of the many factors, it is difficult to know which, if any, were
controlling on the issue of "successorship." Two circuit court cases
suggest that continuity of ownership and senior management under
merely a different corporate entity might be important." The trans-
fer of stock ownership to a son and a son-in-law was not considered
a change in the "employing industry" sufficient to avoid "successor-
ship." It is also possible that weight was given to the possibility of
bad faith pursuant to the transfer of a business." In Stonewall Cot-
ton Mills, the Board made no specific finding of bad faith. Instead,
the manufacture of the same products at the same plant with the
same equipment and work force were cited as indicating that "no
essential attribute of the employment relationship has been
changed as a result of the transfer. . . ." However, it seems impos-
sible to ignore that the predecessor sold the business after the union
won an election and before certification. In NLRB v. McFarland,5
the sale was consummated at the same time as the original union
certification. The court found "successorship" relying ostensibly
upon the continuation of an ore hauling business essentially un-
changed in character. While the court rejected the purchaser's con-
tention that the business had become integrated into its larger oper-
ation, it used language indicating one instance when "successor-
ship" might not exist.
If the transfer operated to effect a basic change in the employing
industry, in the sense that the trucking operation of the predeces-
sor became merged or integrated into the larger business of Res-
11. NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Lunder Shoe
Corp., 211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1954).
12. NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960).
13. NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962); Stonewall Cotton Mills, 80
N.L.RB. 325 (1948).
14. 80 N.L.R.B. 325 (1948).
15. NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962).
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pondent so as to lose its identity, then the bargaining unit is no
longer appropriate and enforcement of the order [to bargain]
should be denied. "
This rationale has been relied upon to find an absence of busi-
ness continuity and therefore "successorship" where control of pol-
icy moved from a national to a local level resulting in a change in
worker-management relationships. Relations, formerly of a disem-
bodied type normally found in a large corporation, became the close,
personal type characteristic of a small, local business. 7 The same
alteration of the "employing industry" has been found where a
smaller company is absorbed and integrated into a larger one."8 This
was especially so where the larger, purchasing company already had
a relationship with another labor organization. 9
In the absence of such basic and sweeping changes to the bar-
gaining unit, "successorship" has generally been found even where
there has been a bona fide transfer with no hint of an active attempt
to avoid formal labor relations."0 The easiest case is one in which
there is a purchase or other transfer of an entire going concern.
[W]here a purchaser continues its predecessor's business from the
same location, handling the same products, and employing the
predecessor's employees, the purchaser is a successor employer
with a duty to recognize and bargain in good faith with the incum-
bent union. "'
Even where assets, rather than an ongoing business, are pur-
chased, the Board and the lower courts have had no trouble finding
"successorship." In Johnson Ready Mix Co.,2 the buyer did not
purchase the predecessor's accounts receivable, did not assume the
accounts payable or any liabilities, and had no obligation to hire its
predecessor's employees. The Board still found "successorship,"
noting that the same products were manufactured from the same
location, using the same equipment, and the same customers were
served. Furthermore, the Board stated:
16. Id. at 220.
17. NLRB v. Alamo White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1959). But cf. NLRB
v. Zayre, 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970).
18. NLRB v. Aluminum Tubular Corp., 299 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1962).
19. Id.
20. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 518 (1964); Johnson Ready Mix Co., 142
N.L.R.B. 437 (1963); Simmons Eng'r Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1373 (1946); Syncro Mach. Co., 62
N.L.R.B. 985 (1945); Nash, Successorship in Light of Burns, 7 GA. L. REV. 664 (1973).
21. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 518 (1964).
22. 142 N.L.R.B. 437 (1963).
1975]
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[M]ost significantly, a majority of the employees in the unit we
have found appropriate were formerly Missouri [the predecessor]
employees, are now performing the same functions they had per-
formed for Missouri, and are directly supervised by former Mis-
souri Supervisors."
Where the predecessor had manufactured products to fill outside
orders while the purchaser of its assets used different machinery to
manufacture different products for its own use, the Board neverthe-
less found "successorship" because for a short period of time the
purchaser agreed to process unfilled orders of its predecessor,
thereby having the same employees do the same work.2 4
The hiring of a predecessor's employees by a transferee became
the single most important factor in determining "successorship. ' '25
If most of the employees hired by the transferee had worked fQr its
predecessor, the Board and the lower courts were likely to find "suc-
cessorship" so as to protect the employees' right to bargain through
their elected representative and to avoid labor strife. As will be
discussed subsequently (pt. Hi, § A), the Supreme Court, in its first
decision in the area of "successorship," 2 was primarily concerned
with the bargaining rights of employees who were absorbed into a
large operation through the merger of two companies. Subsequent
to this decision, the Board continued to place great importance
upon the numbers of a predecessor's employees hired by a transferee
in finding "successorship. ' ' 21 Eventually the Board developed a
numbers test which it felt must be met in order for "successorship"
to exist.28
By applying a "number of retained employees" test and refer-
ring to numerous other factors, the Board and the courts determined
whether a transferee was a "successor" employer with a duty to
bargain with the union representing the predecessor's employees.
However, before Wiley the Board was careful to distinguish between
a "successor's" duty to bargain and any obligation under a labor
23. Id. at 441.
24. Syncro Mach. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 985 (1945).
25. See authorities cited note 20 supra; Consolidated American Servs., Inc., 148
N.L.R.B. 1521 (1964); Colony Materials, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 105 (1961); National Bag Co., 65
N.L.R.B. 1078, enforced, 156 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1946).
26. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
27. Ideal Laundry Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 1259 (1968); Thomas Cadillac, Inc., 170
N.L.R.B. 884 (1968); Hackney Iron & Steel Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 613 (1967); Quaker Tool & Die,
Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1307 (1967); Valleydale Packers, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1486 (1967); Mainte-
nance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1964).
28. Tallakson Ford, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 503 (1968).
[Vol. 40
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contract between the predecessor and its employees' union. The
''successor" generally was not bound by such a collective bargaining
agreement. 9 Furthermore, a contract was, after the transfer, no
longer a bar to a representation petition." Therefore, unless the
certification period was still in effect, the transfer would subject the
union to a possible loss of representative status in favor of another
union.
Although the doctrine of "successorship" was well developed by
the Board and the lower federal courts when the Supreme Court
entered the field in 1964, the Court has avoided the use of the term
"successor" in determining the obligations of a subsequent em-
ployer. Instead, it has defined the obligations of such an employer
in light of the specific circumstances of each case. In examining the
Supreme Court cases on the subject, this comment will explore both
whether there is a real practical difference between the Board's
approach of determining whether an employer is a "successor"
based upon the circumstances of each case and then imposing cer-
tain obligations due to that status and the Court's approach of
determining obligations directly from the facts and what the Su-
preme Court believes are the obligations of subsequent employers.
I. WILEY - BURNs - HowARD JOHNSON
A. Wiley
1. The Case
John Wiley & Sons, a large publishing firm employing nearly
300 employees, merged with Interscience Publishers, Inc. on Octo-
ber 2, 1961. At the time of the merger, 40 of Interscience's 80 em-
ployees were represented by a union. A collective bargaining agree-
ment expiring on January 31, 1962 did not contain a provision mak-
ing it binding on successors of Interscience. The agreement did,
however, contain a provision -requiring arbitration of issues which
could not be resolved among the parties. The union contended that
it continued to represent the covered employees taken over by Wiley
and that Wiley had to recognize certain vested rights of these em-
ployees. Wiley contended that the merger terminated the bargain-
ing agreement and refused to recognize the union as the bargaining
agent or accede to the union claims. Before the contract expired, the
union brought a proceeding under section 301 of the Labor Manage-
29. Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1964); Cruse Motors, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953).
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ment Relations Act 3' to compel Wiley to arbitrate the unresolved
issues pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.
Relying upon the statement in Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills" that section 301 authorizes the development of a federal
common law of collective bargaining," the Supreme Court noted
that federal law controlled and held specifically that:
the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does
not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered
. . . and. . . in appropriate circumstances, present here, the suc-
cessor employer may be required to arbitrate. . . under the agree-
ment."
This holding was of major significance because an employer had
never before been held subject to the substantive terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement which it had neither signed nor agreed
to assume. The Court did not decide what parts of the predecessor's
agreement were binding upon the successor and did not hold that
the duty to arbitrate always survives; rather the duty to arbitrate
exists when the ownership or corporate structure of an enterprise is
changed only if there is "continuity of identity in the business enter-
prise before and after a change. '35
The Court, while acknowledging that the law governing ordi-
nary contracts would not bind to a contract an unconsenting succes-
sor to a contracting party, noted that a collective bargaining agree-
ment is not an ordinary contract. In holding Wiley subject to the
arbitration provision, the Court relied upon "the central role of
arbitration in effectuating national labor policy" 3' and the fact that
New York state law provided that no claim or demand against a
constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.
The philosophy behind the holding is best illustrated by this pas-
sage from the decision:
Employees ... ordinarily do not take part in negotiations leading
31. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1971). This section permits suits for violations of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization. Most NLRB suits are based upon unfair labor practices
or failures to bargain, and do not arise out of contract.
32. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
33. Id. at 451.
34. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964).
35. Id. at 551.
36. The Court stated, 376 U.S. at 549-50:
The preference of national labor policy for arbitration as a substitute for tests
of strength between contending forces could be overcome only if other considera-
tions compellingly so demanded. We find none.
[Vol. 40
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to a change in corporate ownership. . . The objectives of na-
tional labor policy ...require that the rightful prerogative of
owners independently to rearrange their businesses . . . be bal-
anced by some protection to employees from a sudden change in
the employment relationship. The transition. . . will be eased and
industrial strife avoided if employees' claims continue to be re-
solved by arbitration . . ..
2. The Aftermath
The Board and the courts immediately emphasized the lan-
guage in Wiley concerning continuity of identity in the employing
enterprise, applying it along with a "number of retained employees"
test to determine the issue of "successorship." The combination of
new ownership and a substantial change in the personnel of the unit
often led to a finding of no "successorship."35 However, one case
found that termination of the employees before transfer of the busi-
ness was actually a constructive termination by the transferee;
therefore, continuity of the enterprise and "successorship" existed. 9
Beyond the "successorship" determination which remained basi-
cally unchanged by Wiley, the cautious and limited holding in
Wiley was soon cited as supporting holdings which went far beyond
its narrow scope.
Shortly after the decision came down, the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied the same reasoning to a situation where the business and
assets of a company were purchased by another." This court found
that the fact that Wiley had involved a merger and the fact that
state law required the successor in a merger to be bound by obliga-
tions of the disappearing entity not to have been the basis of the
Wiley decision. Other cases relied on Wiley to require a "successor"
to correct the unfair labor practices of its predecessor." One court
held that the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement did
not permit the "successor" to act unilaterally without affording the
union a reasonable opportunity to bargain." Several cases stated
that the employees of a predecessor became employees of the "suc-
cessor" and therefore the "successor" employer was obligated to
37. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
38. NLRB v. John Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc., 338 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1964); Apex
Record Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 333 (1966).
39. Young's Super Mkt. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1967).
40. Wackenhut Corp. v. Int'l Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America, 332 F.2d
954 (9th Cir. 1964).
41. See Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967).
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bargain concerning seniority and hiring of employees. 3 These deci-
sions, in effect, obligated the "successor" to abide by the predeces-
sor's collective bargaining agreement upon hiring its own employ-
ees. Thus, the Wiley holding was greatly expanded.
The final step was a holding by the Board in Burns44 and several
other cases" that a "successor" not only had to bargain with the
predecessor's union, but also was bound to adhere to the substantive
provisions of the predecessor's collective bargaining contract. These
holdings were subsequently reversed. 6
B. Burns
1. The Case
Prior to July 1, 1967, Wackenhut Corp. provided plant protec-
tion services for Lockheed at an airport in California. On February
28, 1967, a majority of Wackenhut guards chose the United Plant
Guard Workers union (UPG) in a Board election. Later, on April 29,
Wackenhut and the union entered into a three-year collective bar-
gaining contract. Wackenhut's one year contract with Lockheed was
to expire on June 30, 1967, and when bids were submitted for subse-
quent service, Burns was awarded the contract. Burns offered em-
ployment to some of Wackenhut's guards but under different terms
of employment. Eventually, Burns employed 27 of the Wackenhut
guards while bringing in 15 of its own. Burns gave the Wackenhut
guards union membership cards in the American Federation of
Guards, the union with which it had collective bargaining contracts
elsewhere. Burns then recognized the union on the basis of a card
majority, but UPG demanded that Burns recognize it and honor the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement between UPG and
Wackenhut. Burns' refusal precipitated unfair labor practice
charges. The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, holding that because a majority of Burns' employees had
been employed by Wackenhut, Burns had a duty to bargain with
Wackenhut's union. Also affirming the court of appeals, the Su-
43. Spruce Up Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 841 (1972); Martin Marietta Corp., 159 N.L.R.B.
905 (1966); Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965).
44. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970).
45. See Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 1035 (1970); Denham Co., 187 N.L.R.B.
434 (1970); Ranchway, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (June 26, 1970).
46. NLRB v. Denham Co., 469 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 411
U.S. 945 (1973); NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 468 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 411 U.S. 914 (1973); NLRB v. Ranchway, Inc., 445 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971),
vacated and remanded, 406 U.S. 940 (1972); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 441
F.2d 911 (2nd Cir.), afl'd, 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
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preme Court held'that a duty to bargain does not carry with it an
obligation to observe the substantive terms of a collective bargain-
ing agreement to which Burns had in no way agreed. Finally, the
Court held that Burns was free to set initial terms of employment
without first bargaining with the union. Such action was held to
constitute an unfair labor practice.
2. Analysis of the Decision
a. Duty to Bargain
Any employer's obligation to bargain with a union arises after
a union is certified by the Board as the bargaining representative
of certain employees. Absent "unusual circumstances," there is an
irrebuttable presumption of union majority status for one year after
certification.47 The same presumption also applies where the union
is voluntarily recognized." The certification (and presumably a vol-
untary recognition) creates a rebuttable presumption of continued
majority status even after the one year period.49 If after the one year
certification period, an employer can show good faith doubt of ma-
jority status, then it might rebut the presumption and could refuse
to bargain." These general propositions of law are equally applica-
ble to a subsequent employer.5'
In Burns, the certification was less than one year old. Thus,
past decisions would indicate that Burns could have avoided bar-
gaining only if "unusual circumstances" existed. The Court stated:
[A] mere change of employers or of ownership in the employing
industry is not such an 'unusual circumstance' as to affect the force
of the Board's certification within the normal operative period if a
majority of employees after the change of membership or manage-
ment were employed by the preceding employer.2
Even if the predecessor's unit or the one existing after the change
of ownership experiences a turnover in personnel, this will not be an
"unusual circumstance" so as to overcome the irrebuttable pre-
47. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954).
48. Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966).
49. Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951).
50. United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652 (1966); Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B.
664, 672 (1951).
51. Terrell Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970), enforcing 173 N.L.R.B.
1480 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406
U.S. 272 (1972). See also NLRB v. Ranchway, Inc., 445 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated
and remanded, 406 U.S. 940 (1972); NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 468 F.2d 963 (7th Cir.
1972), vacated and remanded, 411 U.S. 914 (1973).
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sumption of majority status. 3 New employees will be presumed to
support a union in the same ratio as those whom they have re-
placed. 4
Language in Burns indicates that in a transfer of owner-
ship/management situation, a good faith doubt might provide an
excuse for a failure to bargain even within the certification year.5
But in a non-transfer situation, the good faith doubt defense is
available only after the one year certification period." A subjective
state of mind is insufficient to support such a doubt.57 There must
be objective facts which furnish a reasonable basis for the asserted
doubt. A showing that less than a majority were members of the
union is not equivalent to showing a lack of union support." Nor
would reliance on isolated reports from vague unidentified sources
of the union membership, the size of the unit, or that several em-
ployees wanted another union constitute the required objective evi-
dence. 0
Despite Burns' reference to good faith doubt, the language of
the opinion suggests that the facts giving rise to such a doubt might
be the same as those constituting an "unusual circumstance." Both
would appear to be presumptively absent where a majority of the
employees after the change of ownership had been employed by the
predecessor and there has been a recent certification. 1 A different
result, however, might ensue where the certification year has ex-
pired. It seems likely that after such time, the objective evi-
dence/good faith doubt approach might be available to the new
owner.2
In a non-transfer case, if a contract exists, there will be "con-
tract bar" even after the end of the certification period. Thus, the
employer could not challenge the representative status of the union
53. U.S. Eagle, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (Mar. 20, 1973).
54. Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1965).
55. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). "Bums' could not
reasonably have entertained a good faith doubt about that [majority status]." Id. at 278.
56. See cases cited note 50 supra.
57. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
58. Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1965).
59. Terrell Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970), enforcing 173 N.L.R.B.
1480 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
60. Id.
61. NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). "Bums' obligation
to bargain with the union over terms and conditions of employment stemmed from its hiring
of Wackenhut's employees and from the recent election and Board certification." Id. at 278-
79.
62. Paramount Paper and Prods., 154 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1067-68 (1965); Mitchell Stan-
dard Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 496, 500 (1963).
[Vol. 40
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or refuse to bargain during the term of the contract. 3 However, in a
transfer situation, the contract, unless assumed, is no longer in ex-
istence after the transfer of ownership. 4 Therefore, it would seem
that the subsequent employer could question the majority status of
a union based upon objective evidence, where the certification pe-
riod has expired.
Ignoring for the moment these previously discussed defenses of
a subsequent employer, his duty to bargain with the union repre-
senting its predecessor's employees arises when a majority of his
work force has been employees of its predecessor.
[Wihere the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority
of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a
recently certified bargaining agent there is little basis for faulting
the Board's. . .ordering the employer to bargain .... 65
Since the Board has never held that an employer is required to
hire all the employees of its predecessor6 unless such an obligation
is assumed, a new employer seems to be free to avoid bargaining by
hiring a majority of its employees from sources other than its prede-
cessor. If, however, it refused to hire its predecessor's employees
because of their union affiliation, it will have committed a section
8(a) (3)7 violation and a "successorship" bargaining obligation will
arise despite the fact that the majority of the predecessor's employ-
ees test is not met. 6
This reliance on a percentage of employees retained is strangely
reminiscent of countless Board decisions. 9 The Board and courts of
appeal have relied heavily upon this factor in finding "successor-
ship." After determining that "successor" status exists, a duty to
bargain with a predecessor's union was an automatic consequence.
The Burns decision carefully avoids any mention of the word "suc-
cessor. '70 The Court chose to find a duty to bargain due to the fact
63. Ecklund's Sweden House Inn, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (May 2, 1973); Hexton Furni-
ture Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 342 (1955).
64. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 291 (1972).
65. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 280 n.5. But see Spruce Up Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 841 (1972); Martin Marietta
Corp., 159 N.L.R.B. 905 (1966); Chemrock, Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965).
67. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (1970).
68. TriState Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Barrington
Plaza & Tragniew, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 962 (1970).
69. See authorities cited notes 20 & 21 supra.
70. The dissent, 406 U.S. at 296, makes note of this. However, the dissent feels that
the majority's position is sustainable only if Bums is considered a successor. The dissent then
goes on to say that it believes there is no successorship because Burns did not assume the
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that most of the employees hired by the new owner had been em-
ployees of its predecessor. The opinion did not utilize the step by
step reasoning of the Board and the circuit courts. However, there
appears to be little difference between the two approaches. The
Court affirmed the Board's decision as to the bargaining order and
in doing so cited several cases employing the "successorship" doc-
trine,7 indicating acceptance of the Board's approach.
Furthermore, while the Court refused to review the Board's
determination of unit appropriateness, it made it clear that continu-
ity of the bargaining unit is critically important in finding an obliga-
tion on the part of the new owner to bargain.
It would be a wholly different case if the Board had determined
that because Burns' operational structure and practices differed
from those of Wackenhut, the Lockheed bargaining unit was no
longer an appropriate one.7 3
The Court's reference to "bargaining unit" seems to be broader than
mere appropriateness under Board standards; it seems to encom-
pass the "employing industry" concept.7 Interpreting Burns in this
fashion, the Board subsequently set out seven factors to be consid-
ered in determining "successorship."75 In essence, the factors deal
with retention of a predecessor's employees and continuity of the
business enterprise. The Tenth Circuit refused to find sufficient
change in the bargaining unit where the new owner assumed only
one of two maintenance contracts formerly performed by its prede-
assets or business of another, but rather competed directly with another and won a contract
previously performed by the other.
71. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281 (1972).
72. But see pt. III, § C of this comment.
73. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280 (1972) (emphasis
added).
74. Nash, supra note 20, at 673.
75. Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (July 17, 1972). The factors
were: (1) whether there has been a substantial continuity of the same business operations;
(2) whether the new employer uses the same plant; (3) whether the new employer has the
same or substantially the same work force; (4) whether the same jobs exist under the same
working conditions; (5) whether he employs the same supervisors; (6) whether he uses the
same machinery, equipment, and methods of production; (7) whether he manufactures the
same products or offers the same services.
76. It is important to note that this discussion does not include alter ego situations
where there is a mere change in form with no real change in the unit or industry. Such
situations include those where the purported new management cannot in reality be distin-
guished from the former management. In such cases, the "new" employer has been held
bound by the acts and contracts of the former. See Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315
U.S. 100 (1942); NLRB v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, Inc., 325 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB
v. Ozark Hardwood Co., 282 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1960).
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cessor. 71 However, the Board, affirmed by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, found that a unit was no longer appropriate where
the predecessor's employees had been members of an 1100 man unit
and the new management took over only a small part of the opera-
tion of the predecessor employing only 41, 14 of whom were new.
The Board, citing Burnsu and the seven factors set out above, 8°
found that the old bargaining unit was no longer appropriate where
the predecessor's employees' duties were expanded and their jobs
were functionally integrated with the other employees of the new
employer." Other important factors in determining the appropriate-
ness of the former bargaining unit to the subsequent employer's
situation are the period during which the predecessor was closed
down before the new employer resumed operations, 2 use of new
equipment, and the manufacture of new products."
These post-Burns decisions illustrate that the doctrines of
"employing industry" and "accretion" 4 and the importance of an
appropriate bargaining unit among a successor's employees remain.
All of this reinforces the proposition that Burns did little to change
the law regarding a successor's obligation to bargain with the union
which had represented its predecessor's employees.
b. Unilaterally Setting Initial Terms of Employment
Once a general obligation to bargain is found, it remains to be
determined what may be done without first discussing it with the
union. The Board's decision in Burns stated that a "successor"
employer had the same obligation to refrain from unilaterally
changing terms of employment established by prior collective bar-
gaining as did a non-"successor." This holding was at least im-
pliedly accepted by the Supreme Court." However, the Board, be-
fore and after Burns, held that even where an employer is not bound
77. NLRB v. Geronimo Serv. Co., 467 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1972).
78. Atlantic Technical Servs. Corp., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (Mar. 5, 1973), enforced sub
nom International Assoc. of Machinists v. NLRB, - F.2d -, 86 L.R.R.M. 2182 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
79. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
80. See note 75 supra.
81. Border Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (July 9, 1973).
82. Norton Foundries Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (Oct. 24, 1972).
83. Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (July 17, 1972).
84. See Columbus Janitor Serv., 191 N.L.R.B. 902 (1971); Humble Oil & Refining Co.,
153 N.L.R.B. 1361 (1965). But see John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964),
where the subject of integration was never discussed as an issue.
85. NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 294 (1972).
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by the terms of the contract, it must not institute terms of employ-
ment different from those provided in its predecessor's contract."
The Supreme Court refused to accept this statement of the law and
affirmed the circuit court which had reversed the Board:
It is difficult to understand how Burns could be said to have
changed unilaterally any pre-existing term or condition of employ-
ment . . . when it had no previous relationship whatsoever with
the bargaining unit and. . . outstanding terms and conditions of
employment from which a change could be inferred. The terms on
which Burns hired employees . . . may have differed from the
terms extended by Wackenhut . . . , but it does not follow that
Burns changed its terms and conditions of employment .... 11
Therefore, a subsequent employer may set the initial terms on
which it will offer employment without bargaining to an impasse.
However, the Court also stated:
There will be instances in which it is perfectly clear that the new
employer plans to retain all the employees in the unit and in which
it will be appropriate to have him initially consult with the em-
ployees' bargaining representative before he fixes terms.88
This language has raised several questions.89 The Board and the
Seventh Circuit felt that there must be a dual finding that (1) it is
"perfectly clear" that a new employer plans to hire all the employ-
ees of its predecessor and (2) it will be appropriate to have the new
employer initially consult with the union." The Seventh Circuit,
over a dissent," made both findings and held that there was a duty
to bargain." At least one author would agree with this interpreta-
tion, believing that the Supreme Court in Burns envisioned two
86. See Emerald Maintenance, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. 876 (1971), enforced inpart, 464 F.2d
698 (5th Cir. 1972); Overnite Trans. Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d 765
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967).
87. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 294 (1972).
88. Id. at 294-95 (emphasis added).
89. Did it mean that no duty to bargain exists until the full complement is hired or does
it immediately exist if it is clear that a predecessor's employees will be hired? S-H Food Serv.,
Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (Sept. 15, 1972), held that existing terms of employment included
those of a predecessor and could not be changed without bargaining where substantially all
the employees of the predecessor are retained. Hecker Mach., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. Nd. 161
(Aug. 29, 1972), held that bargaining is necessary only after hiring is completed and it is clear
that majority status exists. Therefore the employer was permitted to set the initial terms
upon which it would hire its predecessor's employees.
90. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 1035 (1970); Howard Johnson Co., 198
N.L.R.B. No. 98 (Aug. 8, 1972).
91. NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 468 F.2d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 1972).
92. Id. at 969.
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extremes - one where the duty would be clear and one where the
duty could not be determined until all hiring is completed - with
a middle ground where it might, nevertheless, be appropriate to
"consult" the union. 93
In any event, after the Supreme Court in reliance on Burns
vacated several circuit court decisions,94 the Board reconsidered the
cases and relied heavily upon factual determinations as to the "per-
fectly clear" issue in deciding whether a duty to bargain existed.
By conditioning employment upon an employee's acceptance of
different wages and working conditions, a new employer would seem
to be able to always avoid the "perfectly clear" language until at
least a portion of a predecessor's employees have been hired. This
easy way to avoid any obligation to bargain imposed by Burns was
the approach taken by the Board in reconsidering Ranchway, Inc.9"
The Board held it was not "perfectly clear" that a majority of the
successor's work force would come from the predecessor's because
the new terms were offered before employees accepted employ-
ment.17 The current Board and circuit court approach, therefore,
seems to be to make a factual determination of "perfectly clear" and
equate this with an appropriateness to "consult" with the union. 8
The meaning of the term "consult" is likewise uncertain. The
Supreme Court might have been referring to some limited bargain-
ing as to things such as employee preferences. Although it would
logically seem that the Supreme Court meant something less than
"bargain" when it said "consult," the terms have generally been
equated by the Board.' 9
Since no duty to bargain exists unless a majority of a new
employer's employees come from its predecessor or until it is "per-
fectly clear" that all of a predecessor's employees will be hired, the
question remains as to when the determination is to be made. An
employer could always argue that it will hire more from outside
sources so as to destroy or delay the duty to bargain. It has been
suggested that the duty to bargain exists when a successor's work
force has grown to the point where it is representative in size and
93. Nash, supra note 20, at 678.
94. See cases cited note 46 supra.
95. See cases cited notes 96-98 infra.
96. 203 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (May 25, 1973).
97. See also Collinge Enterprises, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (April 12, 1974).
98. See NLRB v. Wayne Convalescent Center, Inc., 465 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir. 1972);
Eklund's Sweden House Inn, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (April 2, 1973).
99. This was suggested by the concurring opinion in International Ass'n of Mach., Dist.
Lodge 94 v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1135, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 889 (1969).
100. See cases cited notes 46, 98 supra.
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composition of the work force which will ultimately be employed.101
However, the duty may not arise until the full work force has been
hired.'02
c. Imposition of the Contract
Perhaps the most important part of the Burns decision is its
holding that a subsequent employer cannot be required to observe
the substantive terms of a labor agreement negotiated by its prede-
cessor. As previously mentioned, after the Wiley decision, the Board
began requiring a "successor" to observe terms of a predecessor's
contract. At about the same time, the Supreme Court decided H.K.
Porter v. NLRB,'13 a case which was not immediately recognized as
having application to the "successorship" area, but which the Su-
preme Court in Burns relied upon heavily. This 1970, non-
successorship case held that while the Board may require parties to
negotiate, it could not compel a union or an employer to agree to
any substantive contractual provisions. ' Section 8(d) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act,' 5 and particularly certain language
from various congressional committee reports, had mandated the
decision in Porter. It has been questioned whether section 8(d) or
Porter should govern a "successorship" case.'0' Both concern situa-
tions where no contract provisions had ever been agreed upon;
whereas in Burns, the predecessor's contract with the union had
already been negotiated and implemented. Nevertheless, Porter and
section 8(d) taken together led the Supreme Court to say of a "suc-
cessorship" situation:
Such a duty [to observe a pre-existing contract] does not, how-
ever, ensue as a matter of law from the mere fact that an employer
is doing the same work in the same place with the same employees
as his predecessor.' 7
101. See Hecker Mach., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 161 (Aug. 29, 1972). Generally a repre-
sentative complement is not present unless 30% of the ultimate complement has been em-
ployed and 50% of the ultimate job classifications are in existence. See General Extrusion
Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958).
102. Central American Airways, 204 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (June 14, 1973).
103. 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
104. The object of [the Labor Management Relations Act] was not to allow
governmental regulation of the terms and conditions of employment, but rather to
ensure that employers and employees could work together to establish mutually
satisfactory conditions.
Id. at 103.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 168(d) (1971).
106. Vernon, Successorship & Collective Bargaining Agreements in Business Combina-
tions & Acquisitions, 24 VAND. L. REV. 903, 911 (1971).
107. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 291 (1972).
[Vol. 40
17
Gates: Gates: Successor Management's Obligations
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975
SUCCESSOR MANAGEMENT'S OBLIGATIONS
While noting that Wiley's goals of industrial peace and em-
ployee protection would be served by observance of the predeces-
sor's contract, the Court clearly established that the bargaining
freedom of both employers and unions is of greater importance.
"Preventing industrial strife is an important aim of federal labor
legislation, but Congress has not chosen to make the bargaining
freedom of employers and unions totally subordinate to this goal."10 8
In addition to freedom of bargaining, the Court found that its
decision would facilitate transfers of failing businesses. A company
might be more willing to attempt a revival of such a business if it
were not burdened with the terms and conditions of employment
contained in the old collective bargaining contract. Furthermore, a
union which made concessions to a financially troubled employer
would be able to extract more favorable terms from a successful
successor.'09
While the subsequent employer is not to be bound by substan-
tive provisions of its predecessor's collective bargaining contract or
to the grievance procedures pertaining to discharge of (or failure to
hire) employees of its predecessor,"10 the Court foresaw instances in
which a successor would voluntarily observe a pre-existing con-
tract."1 Furthermore, the Court stated:
[I]n a variety of circumstances involving a merger, stock acquisi-
tion, reorganization, or assets purchase, the Board might properly
find as a matter of fact that the successor had assumed the obliga-
tions under the old contract.12
The Court indicated one type of situation where a new employer
would be held to have assumed the obligation of its predecessor's
collective bargaining contract."' Since Burns, the Board has found
assumption of a predecessor's contract where, although expressly
not assuming it, the new employer granted wage increases only after
108. Id. at 287.
109. Id. at 287-88.
110. Id. at 288. Apparently Burns overruled several cases which indicated that employ-
ees of a predecessor were also the successor's employees, and thus grievance procedures of a
predecessor's contract must be utilized before a successor could deny employment to such
employees.
111. Id. at 291. The opinion states: "In many cases. . . successor employers will find
it advantageous not only to recognize and bargain with the union but also to observe the pre-
existing contract rather than to face uncertainty and turmoil."
112. Id.
113. The Court cited Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1963), thus implic-
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complying with the contract, honored a dues check-off provision
after the transfer, and used the old contract as a base for negotia-
tions of a new one."1 However, another "successor" was found not
to have assumed a predecessor's contract by merely complying with
the provisions of its unexpired contract."5
If a subsequent employer is found to have assumed its predeces-
sor's collective bargaining contract, then would a union also be
bound or could it require new bargaining? The question would be
important to a union which has made concessions to a failing prede-
cessor. The only decision is pre-Burns and suggests that even with-
out a clause specifically binding the union in a successorship situa-
tion, it must observe the old contract.'5
3. Scope of the Decision-Conflict with Wiley
The dissent in Burns would not even have held Burns obligated
to bargain with the predecessor's union. They believed such a duty
could be imposed only in a "successorship" situation which they
found absent because Burns was a direct competitor of Wackenhut
rather than a transferee of Wackenhut's business.' 7 However, any
thoughts that Burns was limited to its facts and that Wiley con-
trolled in true transferee cases were quickly eliminated by mass
application of the Burns holding and reasoning to a myriad of fact
situations. '8
Burns' rejection of the imposition of substantive terms of a
predecessor's contract upon its transferee gave rise to an apparent
inconsistency between Burns and Wiley. Wiley was required to arbi-
trate in accordance with the terms of its predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement and thereby be bound by other substantive
terms as decided by the arbitrator. The Wiley case was unconvinc-
ingly distinguished in Burns on grounds that Wiley involved a sec-
tion 301 action to compel arbitration, there being an historical pref-
erence for arbitration of labor disputes, while Burns was an unfair
114. Ecklund's Sweden House Inn, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (May 2, 1973).
115. Noriega Indus., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 130 (Feb. 15, 1973).
116. Kota Div. of Dura Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 360 (1970).
117. NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 296-310 (1972).
118. Purchase of Assets: Anita Shops, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (June 12, 1974); Norton
Foundries Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (Oct. 24, 1972); Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198
N.L.R.B. No. 41 (July 17, 1972). New Franchises: Crotona Serv. Corp., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 97
(Dec. 5, 1972); Milwaukee Engine & Equip. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (July 21, 1972);
Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 98 (Aug. 8, 1972); Southline System Serv., Inc., 198
N.L.R.B. No. 71 (July 27, 1972). Mortgage Foreclosed: NLRB v. Wayne Convalescent Center,
Inc., 465 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir. 1972).
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labor practice action. This distinction remained until the Supreme
Court decided Howard Johnson."9
C. Howard Johnson
Howard Johnson, like Wiley, was a case brought pursuant to
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The union
representing a majority of the employees of the predecessor
employer, Belleville Restaurant Co., sued to compel the purchaser,
Howard Johnson Co., Inc., to arbitrate its duty to hire its predeces-
sor's employees. The Grissom family which owned the Belleville
Restaurant Co. had operated a Howard Johnson's motor lodge and
restaurant under franchise agreements. All of the franchise's em-
ployees were represented by the same union which had entered into
collective bargaining agreements with the Grissoms. The agree-
ments provided, unlike the one in Wiley, that the provisions would
be binding on successors. However, when Howard Johnson pur-
chased the personal property and leased the real property from the
Grissoms, it expressly did not assume the labor contracts of its
predecessor. Howard Johnson commenced operations with 43 em-
ployees versus 54 employed by the Grissoms. Of these 43, only 9,
none of which were supervisory personnel, had previously worked for
the Grissoms.
The district court 10 and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 1 ' both
held, relying heavily upon Wiley, that Howard Johnson was re-
quired to arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the former Gris-
som employees. While the labor bar had doubtlessly hoped for an
end to the Burns-Wiley inconsistency, the Supreme Court refused
to decide if any "irreconcilable conflict" exists. The Court stated
that the reasoning of Burns must be taken into account in a suit to
compel arbitration:
It would be plainly inconsistent with this view [that federal com-
mon law must not ignore national labor laws] to say that the basic
policies found controlling in an unfair labor practice context may
be disregarded by the courts in a suit under § 301, and thus permit
the rights enjoyed by the new employer in a successorship context
to depend upon the forum in which the union presses its claim.
Clearly the reasoning of Burns must be taken into account here.12
119. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., - U.S. , 94 S.
Ct. 2236 (1974).
120. - F. Supp. -, 81 L.R.R.M. 2329 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
121. 482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973).
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The Court held that Howard Johnson had no obligation to arbitrate
its duty to the former Grissom employees."3
The major portion of the opinion was devoted to distinguishing
the fact situation in Howard Johnson from that in Wiley. The Court
found the distinction between a merger and a sale of assets impor-
tant.124 Because of the state law rule that the surviving corporation
in a merger is liable for the obligations of the one which disappears,
the successor in Wiley would have had a reasonable expectation that
it would be bound by its predecessor's contract. No such expectation
would exist where there was a mere sale of assets. Also, disappear-
ance meant the union's only possible recourse was against the sur-
viving corporation, while in Howard Johnson, the Grissom corpora-
tion continued in existence with substantial assets. Considered of
even more importance as a distinguishing feature was the fact that
Wiley hired all of its predecessor's employees while Howard Johnson
hired its own work force. The consequence of this was that while in
Wiley the union sought arbitration of the rights of Wiley employees,
the union in Howard Johnson sought not to arbitrate rights of How-
ard Johnson employees but to arbitrate on behalf of persons not
employed by Howard Johnson. Since the Court found that Burns
gave Howard Johnson the right not to hire Grissom employees'25 and
that Wiley required arbitration only where there is substantial con-
tinuity of identity in the business enterprise, Howard Johnson was
not required by Wiley to grant arbitration and was prohibited by
Burns from so doing because the union's goal was a requirement
that Howard Johnson hire all the Grissom employees. Wiley sought
only protection from sudden changes in the terms and conditions of
employment for retained employees.12' Thus the holding in favor of
Howard Johnson was compelled so that "the protection afforded
employee interests in a change of ownership by Wiley is. . .recon-
ciled with the new employer's right to operate the enterprise with
his own independent labor force."'27
123. Id. at 2244.
124. Thereby apparently overruling the expansion of the Wiley rationale even in § 301
cases where not involving a merger. See Wackenhut Corp. v. Int'l Union, United Plant Guard
Workers of America, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
125. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 94 S.Ct. 2236, 2243
(1974). However, the citation is to a footnote in Burns which merely states this as Board policy
up to the time of Burns. But see Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 n.6
(1973).
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IV. CONCLUSION -
WHAT ARE THE OBLIGATIONS OF NEW MANAGEMENT?
The Supreme Court in Howard Johnson rejected the court of
appeals' approach of first determining that new management was a
"successor" and then asking whether a "successor" must arbitrate.
The question whether Howard Johnson is a 'successor' is simply
not meaningful in the abstract. Howard Johnson is of course a
successor employer in the sense that it succeeded the operation of
a restaurant and motor lodge formerly operated by the Grissoms.
But the real question. . . is. .. what are the legal obligations of
the new employer to the employees of the former. . owner ....
The answer . . . requires analysis of the interests of the new em-
ployer and the employees and of the policies of the labor laws in
light of the facts of each case. .... 2
This, of course, is not helpful to future employers who would like to
know what their obligations are before they assume a former em-
ployer's business. But while the Court rejected a mechanical ap-
proach, it did make clear what Burns and the Board had long held:
that the most important factor in determining whether the new
management has any obligations to the employees of its predecessor
is whether a substantial portion of the employees are re-hired.
"Since there was plainly no substantial continuity of identity in the
work force hired by Howard Johnson with that of the Grissoms...
the courts below erred in compelling the Company to arbitrate
"129
Burns means that an absence of continuity in the work force
will mean no obligation exists, even to bargain with the union repre-
senting the employees of one's predecessor. Howard Johnson stands
for the proposition that such an absence will also mean no obligation
exists to observe an arbitration clause in a predecessor's collective
bargaining contract with respect to the predecessor's employees'
rights. Since new management has the right to hire or not hire
whomever it chooses, it appears that all obligations to the predeces-
sor's union can be avoided.13 However, if one hypothesizes a situa-
tion where continuity exists in the work force, the apparent inconsis-
tency between Wiley and Burns remains to haunt the new employer.
Burns allows the new employer to ignore substantive terms of a
128. Id. at 2243, n.9.
129. Id. at 2244.
130. However, hiring cannot be done with prejudice toward employees who are
union members. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
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predecessor's collective bargaining agreement even where continu-
ity of the work force exists. By deciding Howard Johnson solely on
its facts, the Court leaves a situation where continuity of the work
force will leave new employers subject to a previous arbitration
clause, while the lack thereof will leave him free. This means either
that Howard Johnson was a very narrow decision and Wiley lives
on, or that Wiley is effectively dead. In light of the feeling in Howard
Johnson that the forum should not govern the outcome'31 and that
the new management should be free to operate its business unen-
cumbered by prior collective bargaining agreements,1 32 this author
believes that the latter is true.'3
LATHROP MEAD GATES
131. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
132. See text accompanying note 127 supra; Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Joint
Executive Bd., 94 S.Ct. 2236, 2243 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S.
272, 287-88 (1972).
133. Except as Wiley is limited to its holding that a successor employer is required
to arbitrate the vested rights of employees which it retains.
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